Abstract-Coding theorems on a (2; 2)-threshold scheme with an opponent are discussed in an asymptotic setup, where the opponent tries to impersonate one of the two participants. A situation is considered where n secrets S n from a memoryless source is blockwisely encoded to two shares and the two shares are decoded to S n with permitting negligible decoding error. We introduce correlation level of the two shares and characterize the minimum attainable rates of the shares and a uniform random number for realizing a (2; 2)-threshold scheme that is secure against the impersonation attack by the opponent. It is shown that if the correlation level between the two shares equals to` 0, the minimum attainable rates coincide with H (S) +`, where H (S) denotes the entropy of the source, and the maximum attainable exponent of the success probability of the impersonation attack equals to`. It is also shown that a simple scheme using an ordinary (2; 2)-threshold scheme attains all the bounds as well.
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. Background and Motivations
A SECRET sharing scheme [1] , [2] is a well-known cryptographic technique that enables us to share a secret data among users. In -threshold schemes, for example, a secret is encoded to shares, and the shares are distributed to respective participants. Any out of participants can recover , while or fewer participants cannot obtain any information on in the sense of unconditional security.
In this paper, we focus on the secret sharing scheme in the presence of opponents. The objective of the opponents is cheating honest participants. That is, the opponents forge their shares and try to cheat the honest participants by injecting the M. Iwamoto is with the Center of Frontier Science and Engineering, the University of Electro-Communications, Chofu-shi, Tokyo 182-8585, Japan (e-mail: mitsugu@uec.ac.jp).
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forged shares in the recovery phase of . This problem was first discussed by McEliece and Sarwate [3] and Karnin et al. [4] from the viewpoint of error-correcting codes. In particular, Karnin et al. [4] and Tompa and Woll [5] clarified that it is impossible to detect cheating in Shamir's secret sharing scheme [1] . In addition, a construction of a cheating-detectable secret sharing scheme is proposed in [5] as an extension of Shamir's secret sharing scheme although it is much inefficient. So far, several schemes have been proposed to overcome such disadvantages [6] - [9] . In particular, Ogata et al. [8] derived a lower bound on sizes of shares under a given maximum success probability of cheating and the lower bound is attained if and only if a difference set exists.
In cheating-detectable threshold schemes, the shares must satisfy unforgeablity as well as the ordinary requirements as a threshold scheme. We can actually consider two types of attacks, impersonation attacks and substitution attacks, similarly to the attacks against secret-key authentication systems [10] . In the impersonation attack, opponents intend to impersonate participants by injecting forged shares without using the legitimate shares. The impersonation attack is regarded as successful if the forged shares are accepted in a recovery phase of a secret. On the other hand, in the substitution attack, some of the participants are malicious and forge their shares by using their shares. The objective of the malicious participants is cheating honest participants who want to recover from their shares.
For instance, Fig. 1 shows the two types of attacks against a -threshold scheme with two shares and . We assume that the ordinary requirements as -threshold schemes, and , are satisfied. In Fig. 1(a) , an opponent generates a forged share without using and and tries to impersonate participant 1 who have a share . In Fig. 1(b) , a participant with forges by using , but not using . We assume that in both cases is generated probabilistically. Then, it is important to notice that is independent of in Fig. 1(a) , while , , and form a Markov chain in this order in Fig. 1(b) . Thus, considering the two types of attacks against threshold schemes corresponds to giving two kinds of probabilistic structures for all the shares including the forged share.
Cheating-detectable secret sharing schemes are usually designed to detect substitution attacks [5] - [9] in a nonasymptotic setup, i.e., the decoding error is not allowed and the block coding is not considered. These studies treat the case where a coalition of more than one malicious participants generates forged shares. However, there exist the following drawbacks in cheating-detectable secret sharing schemes.
1) According to [8] , it is easy to derive the lower bounds of share rates, i.e., information bits per secret needed to describe shares, under a given success probability of cheating. Unfortunately, however, this result implies that the optimal share rates increase in order at least as , and hence, an arbitrarily small success probability of cheating cannot be realized with fixed finite share rates.
2) An extension of Shamir's -threshold scheme in [5] can detect both substitution and impersonation attacks. This scheme is simple but inefficient from the viewpoint of share sizes. In addition, the optimal construction [8] is based on a combinatoric structure called a difference set, where the difference set exists only in limited cases and therefore restricts sizes of a secret and shares. Hence, even in a -threshold scheme, we cannot apply the optimal scheme to a secret of arbitrarily given size. 3) Almost all constructions include the assumption that a secret is generated subject to a uniform probability distribution. This means that developing a near-optimum cheatingdetectable secret sharing scheme for a secret subject to a nonuniform becomes another problem [9] . In this paper, we focus on the impersonation attack against a -threshold scheme. Since the impersonation attack is weaker than the substitution attack, the impersonation attack is rarely discussed especially in the framework of secret sharing schemes. However, if we discuss the threshold scheme secure against impersonation attack in a certain asymptotic setup, we can unveil another information-theoretic aspect. In fact, we can find connections to hypothesis testing, authentication codes, and Shannon's cipher system. In a practical point of view, we can consider a situation where impersonation attack seems to be valid. Suppose that in a -threshold scheme one of the shares, say , is a uniform random number that is independent of a secret . In this case, the participants having may generate subject to a distribution close to the uniform distribution because analysis of gives almost no information to the participant.
B. Contribution of This Study
In this paper, we formulate the problem of a threshold scheme secure against impersonation attacks in Shannon-theoretic asymptotic setup [11] , [12] , and unveil new features included in the problem. We consider a situation where secrets that are generated from a discrete memoryless source are blockwisely encoded to two shares and the two shares are decoded to secrets with permitting negligible decoding error. While we consider impersonation attacks, the asymptotic -threshold scheme treated in this paper has the following features which resolve the three drawbacks pointed previously in cheating-detectable secret sharing schemes.
1) An exponentially small success probability of impersonation attack is realized under finite share rates if the blocklength is sufficiently large. 2) The scheme uses no combinatoric structure and is applicable to arbitrary size of a secret.
3) The probability distribution of a secret is arbitrary. In addition, the scheme can be applied to a more general class of sources. Specifically, we give coding theorems on the -threshold scheme for two cases of blockwise encoding and symbolwise encoding. In both cases, we are interested in the minimum attainable rates for not only the two shares but also the uniform random number needed to a dealer for realizing a cheating-detectable -threshold scheme in an asymptotic sense. We also evaluate the maximum attainable exponent of the success probability of the impersonation attack. It turns out that, if the two shares are correlated, we can easily realize the -threshold scheme in an asymptotic sense that is secure against the impersonation attack. This fact motivates us to define a notion of correlation level of the two shares as the limit of the normalized mutual information between the two shares. In a nonasymptotic setup, we note that correlated shares are first discussed in [13] based on a combinatorial argument. In the case of blockwise encoding, we consider an encoder that encodes secrets blockwisely to two shares and by using a uniform random number , where throughout this paper the superscript denotes the length and the subscripts indicate dependence of . The two shares and are decoded to with decoding error probability that satisfies as . The two shares are required to satisfy the security criteria and as , where denotes the mutual information. We can prove that, if the correlation level of the shares is equal to , none of the rates of , and cannot be less than , where denotes the entropy of the source, and the exponent of the success probability of impersonation attack cannot be greater than (converse part). Furthermore, we can prove the existence of a symbolwise of pairs of an encoder and a decoder that attains all the bounds shown in the converse part (direct part). Both claims of the direct and the converse parts are easily extended to the case where is generated from a stationary ergodic source.
In the case of symbolwise encoding, we consider an encoder that encodes secrets to two shares and of length by using uniform random numbers . In fact, and are generated by for , where is an arbitrary deterministic encoder of an ordinary -threshold scheme satisfying and . Denote by a deterministic map satisfying . We choose an appropriate so that , can be regarded as i.i.d. correlated random variables. It is shown that we can realize a -threshold scheme in an asymptotic sense in which vanishes as , and satisfy a stronger requirement on the secrecy and the exponent of the success probability of the impersonation attack is optimal. In the proof, we construct a decoder of and by using and a one-sided test for verifying the joint typicality of and . This kind of symbolwise setup is first discussed in [14] for authentication code.
C. Related Works, Organization
The -threshold scheme secure against the impersonation attack is motivated from the Shannon-theoretic authentication codes [10] , [14] - [16] . In particular, in [14] the authors discuss the maximum attainable error exponent on the success probability of the impersonation attack subject to the vanishing decoding error probability. However, the results given in this paper are more involved. In fact, in the framework of -threshold schemes we need to guarantee secrecy of a secret given one of the two shares. In addition, in this paper we succeeded in obtaining not only such a maximum exponent but also the minimum attainable sizes of the shares and the uniform random number.
The
-threshold scheme with detectability of impersonation attacks with the blockwise encoder can be viewed as one version of Shannon's cipher system ([17] - [21] , etc.) when one of the shares is an output from a random number generator. In a simple asymptotic setup of Shannon's cipher system [20] , plaintexts generated from a memoryless source are encrypted to a cryptogram under a key and is decrypted to under the same key with permitting decoding error probability . The encoder and the decoder are required to satisfy and as . In this setup, the minimum attainable rates of the cryptogram and the key coincide with the entropy of the plaintext. The coding theorems given in this paper imply the same result under an additional requirement such that the correlation level of and is equal to zero, i.e., . The -threshold scheme with detectability of impersonation attacks with the symbolwise encoder is related to the problem of secret key agreement [21] , [22] . In the secret key agreement problem of the source type model [22] , two users have outputs and from two correlated memoryless sources, respectively, where , are i.i.d. copies of subject to a joint probability distribution . The two users try to share a nearly uniform random number with the maximum rate by public communications. On the contrary, the symbolwise encoder in the -threshold scheme with detectability of impersonation attacks can be interpreted as a generator of correlated random variables and given independent random variables and , where , are regarded as i.i.d. copies of . Since the correlation level and coincides with , the minimum attainable rate of turns out to be . That is, we need an extra cost of in order to generate correlated two shares.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, a -threshold scheme with detectability of impersonation attacks with correlation level in an asymptotic setup is formulated. The coding theorems for the blockwise encoder are given in Section III. Section IV is devoted to the proofs of the coding theorems. A construction of encoders and decoders based on a nonasymptotic -threshold scheme and its optimality are discussed in Section V.
II. PROBLEM SETTING
We consider a -threshold scheme depicted in Fig. 2 . Assume for an integer that a source generates an -tuple of secrets independently subject to a probability distribution on a finite set . Denote by the probability distribution of induced by , and let be the probability that for . Since the source is memoryless, it holds that for all where . In Fig. 2, let be the random variable subject to the uniform distribution on a finite set . Assume that is independent of . In this paper, we use the subscript to indicate dependence of , while the superscript implies the length. We denote by a probability distribution of , i.e., it holds that for all where denotes the cardinality.
An encoder is defined as a deterministic map , where and are finite sets in which shares and take values, respectively. Hence, we can write
from which we can see that and are also random variables. The joint probability distribution of and is induced from (1) . The shares and are distributed securely to participants 1 and 2, respectively.
Next, consider a situation where an opponent may impersonate one of the two participants. When the opponent impersonates participant 1, the opponent behaves as if he/she were a participant 1 by injecting a forged share instead of . This attack is regarded as successful if a decoder fails to detect impersonation attacks and outputs an element of from and . Here, we assume that the opponent generates without using . According to [10] , [14] - [16] , such attack is called impersonation attack as opposed to substitution attack. Similarly, in the case of deceiving participant 1, the opponent forges a share without using , and tries to impersonate participant 2. In this case, the attack succeeds when the decoder outputs an element of from and . Summarizing, letting and be the inputs to a decoder, the following three cases must be considered:
(a0) ; (a1) ; (a2) A decoder is defined as a deterministic map , where is a symbol to declare the detection of an impersonated attack, i.e., (a1) or (a2). We note here that the decoder cannot know in advance which one of (a0)-(a2) actually occurs. On the other hand, we assume that the opponent knows everything about the encoder and the decoder except for realizations of , and . In this situation, we define success probabilities of impersonation attacks. Let be the region that the decoder accepts the pair of shares and outputs an element of , i.e.,
Now, recall that the impersonation attack succeeds if the decoder outputs an element of when one of (a1) and (a2) occurs. In the case of (a1), i.e., the opponent impersonates participant 1, we note that he/she generates a forged share according to a probability distribution independently from , , , and . In addition, the opponent tries to optimize so that can be accepted by the decoder with the maximum probability. This motivates us to define a success probability to impersonate participant 1 by (3) where the maximization of is taken over all probability distributions on , and means the probability with respect to the (joint) probability distribution of random variable(s) between the parentheses, i.e., in this case. Similarly, the maximum success probability for the impersonation to participant 2 can be defined as (4) where is taken with respect to .
The decoding error occurs when is not correctly decoded from legitimate shares in the case of (a0). Hence, the decoding error probability can be written as (5) It is easy to see that if , then . Hence, we have (6) for any pair of an encoder and a decoder . Now, we can define a -threshold scheme in an asymptotic setup as follows.
Definition 1:
We say that a sequence of an encoder and a decoder asymptotically realizes a -threshold scheme if it satisfies (7) and (8) where denotes the mutual information. Condition (7) guarantees that the decoding error probability is negligible if the blocklength is sufficiently large. Note that Fano's inequality [23, Theorem 2.10.1] tells us that (9) where throughout this paper, and and are the conditional and binary entropies, respectively. Hence, if (7) is satisfied, then we have (10) due to the nonnegativity of the conditional entropy. On the other hand, condition (8) ensures that is secure against the leakage from one of and if is sufficiently large. That is, and either one of the shares are almost independent under such a condition. We also note that since is generated from a memoryless source, (8) implies that (11) where denotes the entropy. We conclude this section with introducing a notion of correlation level. The mutual information of two shares plays a crucial role in detecting impersonation attacks, which will be clarified in the following sections.
Definition 2:
Let be a pair of shares generated by a sequence of encoders . Then, a nonnegative number is said to be a correlation level of if it holds that (12) In particular, if a sequence of an encoder and a decoder satisfies Definition 1 and the sequence of shares generated from satisfies (12), we say that asymptotically realizes a -threshold scheme with correlation level .
Remark 1:
Note that the sequence in (12) does not have a limit in general if is generated by an arbitrary sequence of encoders . Hence, (12) actually requires the existence of the limit for the sequence , and the limit equals to .
III. CODING THEOREMS FOR A -THRESHOLD SCHEME WITH DETECTABILITY OF IMPERSONATION ATTACKS
In this section, we give coding theorems for that asymptotically realizes a -threshold scheme with correlation level . We are interested in not only the rates of , , and but also the exponents of and of the sequence . The following theorem is the converse part of the coding theorem with respect to such rates and exponents.
Theorem 1: For any sequence
of an encoder and a decoder that asymptotically realizes a -threshold scheme with correlation level , it holds that (13) (14) (15) and (16) Theorem 1 is proved in Section IV-A. Theorem 1 tells us that for an arbitrarily small the rates of , , and cannot be less than for all sufficiently large , where is an arbitrarily given correlation level. In fact, by noticing that for any , the bounds on the right-hand sides of (13)- (15) (19) and (20) In particular, the above also satisfies (21) which is stronger than the condition in (8) . The proof of Theorem 2 is given in Section IV-B.
Remark 2: Theorem 1 guarantees that in Theorem 2 attains the minimum rates of , , and , and the maximum exponents of and . Furthermore, the limits exist for these rates and exponents, i.e., it holds that (22) and (23) IV. PROOFS OF THEOREMS 1 AND 2 This section is devoted to the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2. In the proof of Theorem 1, we use a relationship between hypothesis testing and the -threshold scheme with detectability of impersonation attacks with correlation level , which originates from [16] and developed in [14] and [15] .
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Fix arbitrarily. We first prove (13) . From the basic properties of the entropy and the mutual information, it holds that (24) Hence, (13) is established because (25) where the last inequality and the equality are due to (24) and (10) - (12), respectively. We can establish (14) in essentially the same way.
Next, we prove (15) . Since the encoder is deterministic for each , we have (26) for all , where the equality follows because is independent of and is generated from a memoryless source. On the other hand, recalling that (27) it follows from (26) and (27) that (28) where the first equality follows from the uniformity of . Therefore, we have (29) where the last inequality follows from (12) and (25) . Note that we have in the same way as (25) .
To prove (16), we use the fact that the decoding error probability and the success probabilities of impersonation attack in a -threshold scheme with correlation level are closely related to the error probabilities of the first kind and the second kind in hypothesis testing, respectively, which is pointed out in [14] - [16] . Let us consider a simple hypothesis test with the following two hypotheses:
Let denote an acceptance region for the null hypothesis . Then, the error probability of the first kind and the error probability of the second kind of the aforementioned hypothesis testing are given by where the first inequality follows from the log sum inequality, and the second inequality holds because . Hence, it follows from (36) and (37) that (38) Therefore, we have (16) by taking the limit superior of both sides of (38) and noticing (34) .
Remark 3:
The claim of Theorem 1 can be easily extended to the case where is generated from a stationary source. For the case of the stationary source, the entropy in the statement of Theorem 1 is replaced with the entropy rate . By recalling the existence of the limit of [23, Theorem 4.2.1], we can easily check that both the left-hand sides of (25) and (29) are bounded by .
B. Proof of Theorem 2
We choose arbitrarily a sequence of positive numbers that satisfies and . Let be the typical set defined by Hereafter, we prove that the aforementioned sequence realizes the optimal -threshold scheme with correlation level that asymptotically attains all the bounds in (17) - (20) . It suffices to prove Claims 1 -5.
Claim 1: For an arbitrarily small , the rates of , , and can be less than for all sufficiently large , i.e., (17)- (19) hold. Claim 2: The limit inferior of the minimum exponent in the success probabilities of impersonation attacks is at least , i.e., (20) holds.
Claim 3: The decoding error probability for the legitimate shares vanishes as goes to infinity, i.e., (7) holds.
Claim 4: For all , the source outputs are secure against the leakage from one of and , i.e., (21) holds. Claim 5: The correlation level between and equals to , i.e., (12) holds.
Proof of Claim 1: In order to evaluate the share rates and the randomness given by (17)- (19) , observe that (47) where the last inequality follows from (41) . Hence, it holds that (48) Taking the limit superior of both sides in (48), Claim 1 is established.
Proof of Claim 2:
We evaluate in the following way:
where and , and the marked equalities follow from the following reasons:
(a) and are independent. (b) holds for all . Similarly, noticing the fact that , we also have , and therefore, we conclude that (50)
Proof of Claim 3:
Since every legitimate pair of shares is decoded by without error, the decoding error happens only if the decoder outputs for a pair of legitimate shares . Hence, the decoding error probability can be written as Therefore, it follows from (40) that .
Proof of Claim 4:
First, we note that and are independent because of nonnegativity of the mutual information and (51) where the last inequality holds because and is subject to the uniform distribution on . Hence, and are also independent because (52)
where the last equality follows since , and , , and form a Markov chain in this order. In order to show (21) , it is sufficient to prove that for all because for any trivially holds from the fact that and are independent. In addition, is established from which is obtained by the information processing inequality [23, Theorem 2.8.1] for a Markov chain , and recalling (52) .
Proof of Claim 5:
The correlation level can be evaluated as follows. Note that the mutual information of shares and satisfies (53) where the marked equalities hold because of the following reasons:
(c) and are independent, and , , and form a Markov chain in this order. (d) It follows that due to the independence of and .
Hereafter, we evaluate the terms on the right-hand side of (53). It is easy to see that (54) The second term on the right-hand side of (53) can be evaluated as (55) where the last inequality follows from (41) . In order to evaluate the last term on the right-hand side of (53), we set . Clearly, from (40) . Since the map is bijective, we have (56) where the inequality holds because of (41) . Hence, we have from (55) and (56) 
and denotes the entropy rate of the source. We construct an encoder and a decoder in the same way as in the proof of Theorem 2. It is easily checked that asymptotically realizes the -threshold scheme. In addition, by the same argument with (48) and (59), satisfies (63) and (64) where as . Note that (64) implies that (65) We now fix a sequence satisfying arbitrarily and define and as the minimum integer satisfying for all . Obviously, is monotone nondecreasing. We define as for each and for each . Then, in view of (63), (65), and as , we can conclude that satisfies (66) and (67) V. ANOTHER OPTIMAL SCHEME USING SYMBOLWISE ENCODING
In Section III, we have shown by using blockwise coding that the sequence of an encoder and a decoder realizes the asymptotically optimal -threshold scheme with correlation level . In addition, also attains the maximum exponent in the success probabilities of impersonation attack which is given by . In this section, by using a symbolwise encoding, we give a simple construction of that realizes the asymptotically optimal -threshold scheme with correlation level and the exponent in the success probability of impersonation attacks equals to . In this construction, we use a pair of an encoder and a decoder for a -threshold scheme for a single source output . In addition, a one-sided test is used to detect the impersonation attacks. Let , and be random variables of a secret, a random number, and two shares taking values in finite sets , and respectively. For a nonnegative number , we first define a pair of an encoder and a decoder for a -threshold scheme with correlation level . That is, the encoder is defined to be a deterministic map satisfying (68) (69) in addition to (70) where shares and are determined by . Note that (68) and (69) are the ordinary requirements for -threshold schemes, i.e., (68) guarantees that any information of does not leak from either one of the shares, and (69) implies that the secret can be decoded from and without error. Hence, let be a decoder corresponding to and satisfying for every that does not belong to the range of . Furthermore, (70) means that the correlation level of and generated by the encoder is equal to . We say that a pair of an encoder and a decoder realizes a -threshold scheme with correlation level in the nonasymptotic sense if satisfies (68) -(70) . In addition, it is shown in [26] that (71) must be satisfied for any encoder of -threshold schemes satisfying (68) and (69) . Hence, we also impose (71) on in addition to (68) -(70) .
In this setting, we define an encoder as the repeated application of to , , which can be written as where the second equality follows from (81) . Furthermore, since is deterministic, it is easy to see that
From (83) and (84), it is shown that is a partition of . Therefore, we have (85) where the first equality comes from the definition of the decoding error probability and the third equality is due to the definition of , i.e., . Hence, we obtain (77) . It is easy to see from (74) that satisfies (7) i.e., the decoding error probability of in (76) vanishes as goes to infinity.
In order to establish Theorem 3, it remains to show that satisfies (20) . Note that (78) and (79) clearly hold from (68) and (70), respectively. To this end, we evaluate the success probability of the impersonation attack as follows: (86) where the first inequality follows from (73) which implies (87) for any . Similarly, we have . Hence, we obtain (20) since .
Since Theorem 3 has been proved, we are now interested in a relation between the share rates and the correlation level attained by a pair of an encoder and a decoder , which is given by the following claim.
Claim 6: Let and be arbitrary positive integers satisfying . Then, there exists a pair ( of an encoder and a decoder for a -threshold scheme with correlation level in the nonasymptotic sense satisfying and .
Remark 5: According to Claim 6, the rates of shares and randomness are , which coincides with the lower bounds of the rates given by (17)- (19) . Hence, the sequence defined by (72) and (76) also achieves all the bounds in Theorem 2. Observe that the sequence of encoders in this section is simpler than the the sequence of encoders presented in Theorems 2. For instance, cannot be encoded symbolwisely by the sequence of encoders in the proof of Theorem 2 since the correlation of two shares is generated by the random variable in both shares contained in common. On the other hand, symbolwise encoding is possible by the sequence of encoders in this section since and are correlated due to for every . Furthermore, such symbolwise encoding also enables us that for every , which is stronger than the security condition given by (21) in Theorem 2.
However, we note that , , and the correlation level cannot be set arbitrarily in Claim 6 although they can be taken arbitrarily in Theorem 2, which is compensation for the simplicity.
Remark 6:
In the threshold scheme with detectability of substitution attacks in a nonasymptotic setup (e.g., [3] - [8] ), it is shown that any ideal secret sharing scheme cannot detect any forgery of shares with probability 1. Furthermore, as is shown in [26] , we note that the ideal secret sharing schemes can be realized if and only if and is uniformly distributed.
Similarly, in the asymptotic setup discussed in this section, it is impossible for any of an ideal -threshold scheme to achieve and with exponential order of because the correlation level is satisfied if and only if and is uniformly distributed. On the other hand, we note that is positive for arbitrary distribution of if .
Proof of Claim 6: From (71), let us define
where . Define the encoder for a secret and a random number as (90) where denotes the subtraction of modulo . Then, the corresponding decoder can be written as if otherwise (91) where represents the addition of modulo . Note that the secret can be decoded by without error, and hence, (69) is satisfied. Furthermore, we can check that a pair of the shares is generated according to the conditional probability distribution if otherwise (92) if we apply the encoder defined in (90) to the secret with an arbitrary probability distribution . Hence, the following discussion holds for an arbitrary distribution on . This idea is based on the secret sharing scheme for nonuniform secret distribution studied in [26] .
We show that (68) From (93) and (94), it is shown that and are statistically independent. Similarly, it can be shown that and are statistically independent, and hence, (68) is proved.
The correlation level of and generated by can be calculated as follows. We note that (95) where the marked equalities (e) and (f) hold since (e) there exists a bijection between and ; (f) and are statistically independent. Therefore, we obtain from (94) and (95) that (96) Hence, it is shown that the pair of the encoder and the decoder actually realizes a -threshold scheme with correlation level .
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper is concerned with coding theorems for a -threshold scheme in the presence of an opponent who impersonates one of the participants. We have considered an asymptotic setup of the -threshold scheme in which secrets from a memoryless source are encoded to two shares by using a uniform random number, and the two shares are decoded to the secrets with permitting negligible decoding error probability. We have investigated the minimum attainable rates of the two shares and the uniform random number, and the maximum exponents of the probabilities of the successful impersonation from a Shannon-theoretic viewpoint. We have presented coding theorems for two cases of encoding, i.e., blockwise and symbolwise encoding.
In the first case, we have considered the situation where the secrets are encoded blockwisely to two shares. We have defined the correlation level of the shares as the limit of the normalized mutual information between the two shares. In the converse part it is shown that for any sequence of pairs of an encoder and a decoder that asymptotically realizes a -threshold scheme with the correlation level , none of the rates can be less than , where denotes the entropy of the source, and the exponent of the probability of the successful impersonation cannot be less than . In addition, we have shown the existence of a sequence of pairs of an encoder and a decoder that attains all the bounds given in the converse part. The obtained results can be easily extended to the case where the secrets are generated from a stationary ergodic source.
In the second case, we have considered the situation where the secrets are encoded symbolwisely to two shares of length by repeatedly applying the encoder of an ordinary -threshold scheme to the secrets. While the aforementioned converse part is valid in this setup, we can give another interesting decoder in the direct part. That is, we have shown that the impersonation by an opponent can be verified with probability close to 1 by verifying the joint typicality of the two shares. It turns out that these encoder and decoder also attain all the bounds in the converse part.
